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Derivative contracts, swaps, and repos enjoy "super-senior" status in bankruptcy: they are exempt
from the automatic stay on debt and collateral collection that applies to virtually all other claims. We
propose a simple corporate finance model to assess the effect of this exemption on firms' cost of borrowing
and incentives to engage in swaps and derivatives transactions. Our model shows that while derivatives
are value-enhancing risk management tools, super-seniority for derivatives can lead to inefficiencies:
collateralization and effective seniority of derivatives shifts credit risk to the firm's creditors, even
though this risk could be borne more efficiently by derivative counterparties. In addition, because
super-senior derivatives dilute existing creditors, they may lead firms to take on derivative positions
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moehmke@columbia.eduDerivatives enjoy special status in bankruptcy under current U.S. law. Derivative coun-
terparties are exempted from the automatic stay, and through netting, closeout, and collater-
alization provisions, they are generally able to immediately collect payment from a defaulted
counterparty. Taken together, these provisions eﬀectively make derivative counterparties
senior to almost all other claimants in bankruptcy. The costs and beneﬁts of this special
treatment are an open question and the subject of a recent debate among legal scholars.1
Moreover, the special treatment does not hold universally in all jurisdictions, which indi-
cates that there is also considerable disagreement among lawmakers about the consequences
of these provisions.2
In this paper, we provide a formal model to investigate the economic consequences of
the privileged treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy, using a standard corporate ﬁnance
modeling framework. Our main argument is that super-seniority provisions for derivatives
cannot be seen in isolation, but must be evaluated taking into account their eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s
other obligations, in particular debt. We argue that while derivatives are generally value-
enhancing through their role as risk management tools, the super-senior status of derivatives
may be ineﬃcient. The reason is that collateralization and (eﬀective) seniority of derivative
contracts does not eliminate risk, but only shifts risk from a ﬁrm’s derivative counterparties
onto the ﬁrm’s creditors. We show that, under fairly general conditions, it is more eﬃcient
if this credit risk is borne by derivative counterparties rather than creditors. We also show
that the super-senior status of derivative contracts may induce ﬁrms to take on derivative
positions that are excessively large from a social perspective (strictly larger than what is
needed to hedge cash ﬂow risk).
In our model a ﬁrm is ﬁnancing a positive NPV investment with debt. Due to operational
cash ﬂow risk, the ﬁrm may not have suﬃcient funds to make required debt payments at
an intermediate date. As the ﬁrm is not able to pledge future cash ﬂows, it is then forced
1See, e.g., Edwards and Morrison (2005); Bliss and Kaufman (2006); Roe (2010); Skeel and Jackson
(2011).
2For example, under current bank resolution law in the U.K. and Germany, closeout and netting provisions
may not always be enforceable (see Hellwig (2011)).
1into default and liquidation, even though continuation would be eﬃcient. We begin our
analysis by showing that in this setting derivatives are valuable hedging tools: by transferring
resources from high cash-ﬂow states to low cash-ﬂow states, derivatives can reduce, or even
eliminate, costly default. Hence, the introduction of derivative markets generally raises
surplus relative to the benchmark case in which no derivatives are available. This result is
in line with the existing literature on corporate risk management, which makes the general
observation that, when ﬁrms face external ﬁnancing constraints and may be forced into
ineﬃcient liquidation, they generally beneﬁt from hedging cash ﬂow risk (see, e.g., Smith
and Stulz, 1985; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993).
The main novelty of our analysis is to consider how the bankruptcy treatment of deriv-
atives aﬀects these beneﬁts from hedging. Although several legal scholars have already
informally argued that there may be costs associated with the eﬀective seniority of deriv-
atives (e.g. Edwards and Morrison, 2005; Bliss and Kaufman, 2006; Roe, 2010; Skeel and
Jackson, 2011), our paper oﬀers the ﬁrst formal ex ante and ex post analysis of this issue.3
The conventional wisdom is that super-seniorty provisions for derivatives lower a ﬁrm’s cost
of hedging and should thus be beneﬁcial overall. We show that this argument is ﬂawed. The
reason is that super-seniority does not eliminate risk, it just transfers risk between diﬀerent
claimants on the ﬁrm’s assets. In particular, while reducing counterparty risk in derivatives
markets, super-seniority increases the credit risk for the ﬁrm’s creditors. In our model, this
shift in risk from derivative markets to debt markets is generally ineﬃcient and results in
a loss of overall surplus. The intuition for this result is simple and surprisingly robust. By
increasing the ﬁrm’s cost of debt and thus the required promised debt repayments, super-
seniority for derivatives has the indirect eﬀect of raising the ﬁrm’s leverage and thus the
3Edwards and Morrison (2005) argue that one potential adverse consequence of the exemption of the
automatic stay is that a ﬁrm in ﬁnancial distress may fall victim to a run for collateral by derivatives
counterparties. Roe (2010) argues that fully protected derivative counterparties have no incentive to engage in
costly monitoring of the ﬁrm. In addition, commentators have pointed out that under the current rules ﬁrms
may have an incentive to ineﬃciently masquerade their debt as derivatives, for example by structuring debt
as total return swaps. In this article, we intentionally abstract away from runs and ineﬃcient substitution
away from debt. Our focus is on whether at the heart of the problem (i.e., before introducing runs or the
ability to masquerade debt as derivatives) there is a reason why derivatives should be senior to debt.
2derivative position required to hedge the ﬁrm’s default risk. When derivatives markets are
not completely frictionless (as, for example, documented in the large literature on hedging
pressure), this increased hedging demand results in greater deadweight costs, such that credit
risk is more eﬃciently borne in the derivative market than in the credit market. We ﬁrst
illustrate this result by comparing the two polar cases of senior and junior derivatives, and
then show that the same intuition also holds in a more general setup that allows for partial
collateralization of derivative positions.
We also show that under the status quo of senior derivatives, ﬁrms may have an incentive
to take on derivative positions that are excessively large from a social perspective. This is
the case whenever the payoﬀ from the derivative contract is not perfectly correlated with
the operational risk of the ﬁrm (in other words, when there is ‘basis risk’). The reason
is that, in the presence of basis risk, an increase in the ﬁrm’s derivative position dilutes
existing debtholders. The beneﬁts from a unit increase in derivatives exposure fully accrue
to the ﬁrm, while some of the cost of the derivative position is borne by existing creditors: in
the event of default, derivative counterparties get paid before ordinary creditors, so that an
increase in the ﬁrm’s derivative position can leave existing creditors worse oﬀ.E ﬀectively,
the senior status of derivatives gives ﬁrms an incentive to speculate in the derivatives market
over and above what is warranted for hedging purposes.
Our model thus predicts that under the status quo equilibrium derivative markets will be
ineﬃciently large: the positions taken in derivatives, swaps and repo markets will be larger
than is socially eﬃcient. This incentive to speculate disappears if the special treatment for
derivatives in bankruptcy were removed. These results are consistent with the view that the
special treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy may be one of the driving forces behind the
tremendous growth of derivatives, swaps and repo markets in recent years. In particular,
it may explain the increase in the size of derivatives markets since the 2005 bankruptcy
reform, which widened the set of derivatives and types of collateral assets to which the
special bankruptcy treatment applies.
3To the extent that the favorable bankruptcy treatment of derivatives leads to ineﬃcien-
cies, an important question is whether ﬁrms can ‘undo the law’, for example by committing
not to collateralize derivative contracts, thus stripping them of their eﬀective seniority. In
this context, our model suggests that the super-seniority provisions for derivatives might
have particular bite for ﬁnancial institutions. While it may be possible to shield physical
collateral from derivative counterparties (for example by granting collateral protection over
plant and equipment to secured creditors), it is generally harder to shield unassigned cash
from collateral calls by derivative counterparties that occur, for example, when a ﬁnancial
institution approaches ﬁnancial distress. In fact, by the very nature of their business, ﬁ-
nancial institutions cannot assign cash as collateral to all depositors and creditors because,
by deﬁnition, this would eliminate their value added as ﬁnancial intermediaries. To the ex-
tent that ﬁrms are unable to contractually undo the eﬀective super-seniority of derivatives,
a change in the bankruptcy code that eliminates the special treatment of derivatives may
be welfare-enhancing. Moreover, even if their are ﬁrms that beneﬁt from prioritizing their
derivative exposures relative to debt, the current regime is most likely over-inclusive in that
it applies to all derivative contracts.
In addition to the law literature on the bankruptcy exemption for derivatives and the
literature on hedging (see the papers mentioned above), our model is also related to the
literature on debt dilution. In particular, in our model excessively large derivatives positions
can result because the bankruptcy code allows ﬁrms to dilute their creditors by taking on
derivative positions that are eﬀectively senior. This dilution is related to the other classic
forms of debt dilution, through risk shifting (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)), the issuance
of additional senior debt (e.g., Fama and Miller (1972)), or by granting security interest to
some creditors (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (1996)). In addition, the ﬁne line between hedging
and speculation that we highlight in our paper is echoed in a recent paper by Biais, Heider,
and Hoerova (2010), who show that when derivatives positions move way out of the money
for one of the parties involved, this may adversely aﬀect the counterparty’s incentive to
4manage risk, resulting in endogenous counterparty risk.
The remainder paper is organized as follows. Section 1 brieﬂy summarizes the special
status of derivative securities in bankruptcy. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 ana-
lyzes a benchmark case without derivatives. Section 4 discusses the eﬀect of the bankruptcy
treatment of derivatives in the case where the derivative has no basis risk. Section 5 extends
the analysis to allow for basis risk and presents the main ﬁndings of our analysis. Section 6
concludes. In the appendix we also develop an extension of our baseline model that allows
for tax beneﬁts of debt.
1 The Special Status of Derivatives
In this section we brieﬂy summarize the special status of derivatives in bankruptcy and
explain why derivatives are often referred so as ‘super-senior.’4 Strictly speaking, derivatives
are not senior in the formal legal sense.5 However, derivatives, swaps and repo counterparties
enjoy certain rights that regular creditors do not enjoy. While not formally senior, these rights
make derivatives eﬀectively senior to regular creditors, at least to the extent that they are
collateralized.
The most important advantages a derivative, repo or swap counterparty has relative to
a regular creditor pertain to closeout, collateralization, netting, and the treatment of eve
of bankruptcy payments, eve of bankruptcy collateral calls, and fraudulent conveyances.
First, upon default, derivative counterparties have the right to terminate their position
with the ﬁrm and collect payment by seizing and selling collateral posted to them. This
diﬀers from regular creditors who cannot collect payments when the ﬁrm defaults, because,
unlike derivative counterparties, their claims are subject to the automatic stay. In fact, even
if they are collateralized, regular creditors are not allowed to seize and sell collateral upon
4The discussion in this section is kept intentionally brief and draws mainly on Roe (2010). For more
detail on the legal treatment of derivatives, see also Edwards and Morrison (2005) and Bliss and Kaufman
(2006).
5As pointed out by Roe (2010, p.5), "The Code sets forth priorities in §§ 507 and 726, and those basic
priorities are unaﬀected by derivative status."
5default, since their collateral, in contrast to the collateral posted to derivative counterparties,
is subject to the automatic stay. Hence, to the extent that a derivative counterparty is
collateralized at the time of default, collateralization and closeout provisions imply that the
derivative counterparty is de facto senior to all other claimants.
Second, when closing out their positions with the bankrupt ﬁrm, derivative counterparties
have stronger netting privileges than regular creditors. Because they can net out oﬀsetting
positions, derivative counterparties may be able to prevent making payments to a bankrupt
ﬁrm that a regular debtor would have to make.6
F i n a l l y ,d e r i v a t i v ec o u n t e r p a r t i e sh a v es t r o n g e rr i g h t sr e g a r d i n ge v eo fb a n k r u p t c yp a y -
ments or fraudulent conveyances. While regular creditors often have to return payments
made or collateral posted within 90 days before bankruptcy, derivative counterparties are
not subject to those rules. Any collateral posted to a derivative counterparty at the time of
a bankruptcy ﬁling is for the derivative counterparty to keep.
Taken together, this special treatment of derivative counterparties puts them in a much
stronger position than regular creditors. While they do not have priority in the strict legal
sense, their special rights relative to other creditors make derivative counterparties eﬀectively
senior. While for most of the remainder of the paper we will loosely refer to derivatives as
being senior to debt, this should be interpreted in the light of the special rights end eﬀective
priority of derivative counterparties discussed in this section.
6The advantages from netting are best illustrated through a simple example. Suppose that a ﬁrm has
two counterparties, A and B. The ﬁrm owes $10 to A. The ﬁrm owes $10 to B, and, in another transaction,
Bo w e s$ 5t ot h eﬁrm. Suppose that when the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy there are $10 of assets in the ﬁrm.
When creditor B cannot net its claims, he has to pay $5 into the ﬁrm. The bankruptcy mass is thus $15.
A and B have remaining claims of $10 each, such that they equally divide the bankruptcy mass and each
receive $7.5. The net payoﬀ to creditor B is $7.5-$5 = $2.5. When creditor B can net his claim, he does
not need to make a payment to the ﬁrm at the time of default. Rather he now has a net claim of $5 on the
bankrupt ﬁrm. As before, A has a claim on $10 on the ﬁrm. There are now $10 to distribute, such that
A receives 2/3*$10 = $6.66 and creditor B receives 1/3*$10 = $3.33. Hence, with netting B receives a net
payoﬀ of $3.33, while without netting he only receives $2.5.
62M o d e l S e t u p
We consider a ﬁrm that can undertake a two-period investment project. This ﬁrm can be
interpreted as an industrial ﬁrm undertaking a real investment project, or as a bank or
ﬁnancial institution that invests in risky loans. The investment requires an initial outlay 
at date 0 and generates cash ﬂows at dates 1 and 2.A td a t e1 the project generates high
cash ﬂow 
1 with probability ,a n dl o wc a s hﬂow 
1  
1 with probability 1 − .A t
date 2 the project generates cash ﬂow 2. Following the realization of the ﬁrst-period cash
ﬂow, the project can be liquidated for a liquidation value .W ea s s u m et h a t0 ≤  2,
implying that early liquidation is ineﬃcient. For simplicity we normalize the liquidation
value at date 2 to zero.
The ﬁrm has no initial wealth and ﬁnances the project by issuing debt.7 Ad e b tc o n -
tract speciﬁes a contractual repayment  at date 1.8 If the ﬁr mm a k e st h i sc o n t r a c t u a l
payment, it has the right to continue the project and collect the date 2 cash ﬂows. If the
ﬁrm fails to make the contractual date 1 payment, the creditor has the right to discontinue
the project and liquidate the ﬁrm. Liquidation can be interpreted as outright liquidation,
as in a Chapter 7 cash auction, or as forcing the ﬁrm into Chapter 11 reorganization. In the
latter interpretation  denotes the expected payment the creditor receives in Chapter 11.
Both the ﬁrm and the creditor are risk neutral, and the riskless interest rate is zero. Unless
we explicitly state otherwise, for most of our analysis we also normalize the ﬁrm’s date 1
liquidation value to  =0 .
The main assumption of our model is that the ﬁrm faces a limited commitment problem
when raising ﬁnancing for the project, similar to Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) and Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990, 1996). More speciﬁcally, we assume that only the minimum date 1
cash ﬂow 
1 is veriﬁable, and that all other cash ﬂo w sc a nb ed i v e r t e db yt h eb o r r o w e r .I n
7In the case of a bank, this means that beyond the minimum equity capital requirement, which we
normalize to zero, the bank must raise the entire amount needed for the loan in the form of deposits. In
what follows, when we interpret the ﬁrm as a bank we also take it that the creditor is then a bank depositor.
8In the case of a bank  denotes the gross interest payment on deposits of size .
7particular, this means that the borrower can divert the amount 
1 − 
1 at date 1 if the
project yields the high return 
1 . This means that after the date 1 cash ﬂow is realized
the ﬁrm can always claim to have received a low cash ﬂow, default and pay out 
1 instead
of . We also assume that at date 0 none of the date 2 cash ﬂows can be contracted upon.
One interpretation of this assumption is that, seen from date 0 the timing of date 2 cash
ﬂows is too uncertain and too complicated to describe to be able to contract on when exactly
payment is due. To make ﬁnancing choices non-trivial, we assume that 
1 ,s u c ht h a t
the project cannot be ﬁnanced with risk-free debt.
Next, we introduce derivative contracts into the analysis. As with debt contracts, we do
this in the simplest possible way. Formally, a derivative contract speciﬁes a payoﬀ that is
contingent on the realization of a veriﬁable random variable  ∈ {}. For example, 
could be a ﬁnancial index or a similar variable that is observable to both contracting parties
and veriﬁable by a court. Veriﬁability is the crucial deﬁning characteristic of a derivative
contract in our model: the ability to verify the derivative payoﬀ m e a n st h a ti nc o n t r a s tt o
cash ﬂows generated through the ﬁrms real operations, cash ﬂows from derivatives positions
can be contracted on without any commitment or enforceability problems.
A derivative contract of a notional amount  is a promise by the derivative counterparty
to pay  to the ﬁrm if  = , against a premium  that is payable from the ﬁrm to
the derivative counterparty when  = . For simplicity, we assume that  is realized
with the same probability as 
1 , i.e., Pr
¡
 = ¢
=1− . Hence, a long position in the
derivative contract pays oﬀ with the same probability as receiving the low cash ﬂow 
1 .
The derivative’s usefulness for hedging the low cash ﬂow outcome is then determined by
the correlation of the derivative payoﬀ with the low cash ﬂow state. We parametrize this










= .( 1 )
This means that if  =1 , the derivative is a perfect hedge for the low cash ﬂow state, since it
8p a y so u ti ne x a c t l yt h es a m es t a t e si nw h i c ht h eﬁrm receives the low cash ﬂow. When 1,
on the other hand, a long position in the derivative only imperfectly hedges the low cash
ﬂow state; with probability (1 − )(1− ) t h ed e r i v a t i v ed o e sn o tp a yo u t even though
1 = 
1 .9
When the ﬁrm enters a derivative position, the other side of the contract is taken by what
we will loosely refer to as the derivative counterparty. This derivative counterparty could be a
ﬁnancial institution, an insurance company, or a hedge fund that is providing hedging services
to the ﬁrm. Typically, providing this type of insurance is not free of costs for the derivative
counterparty. For example, faced with a notional exposure of , the counterparty may face
costs as it has to post collateral or set aside capital in order to fulﬁll capital requirements.
In addition, if not all of the exposure created by the derivative is fully hedgeable, (or if it
is only hedgeable at a cost) the derivative counterparty incurs a deadweight cost for each
unit of notional protection that it writes to the ﬁrm. We capture these costs in the simplest
possible way, by assuming that when entering a derivative contract with a notional amount
of , the derivative writer incurs a deadweight hedging cost of (),10 where (0) = 0 and
0 (·)  0.11 We will explicitly illustrate most of our ﬁndings for a linear hedging cost function
()=. However, qualitatively none of our main ﬁndings will depend on this particular
functional form, in fact our main results continue to hold as long as (·) is increasing.12
The ﬁrm enters the derivative contract after it has signed the debt contract with the
creditor. Moreover, we assume that at the initial contracting stage the ﬁrm and the creditor
9Note that we have chosen the unconditional payoﬀ probability of the derivative to coincide with the
probability that the low cash ﬂow obtains (both are equal to 1 − ). This is not necessary for the analysis.
We could more generally assume that the derivative pays oﬀ with probability 1 − . Our setup has the
convenient feature that when  =1 , the derivative is a perfect hedge: it pays if, and only if, the ﬁrm’s cash
ﬂow is low.
10In addition to the direct costs of hedging to the derivative writer, () may also contain the cost of
potential systemic risk created by the derivative writer.
11While we take this cost of hedging as exogenous, the hedging cost could be derived from ﬁrst principles.
For example, in the model of demand-based option pricing of Gârleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009),
the hedging cost arises endogenously because not all of the risk in the derivatives position can be hedged.
The literature on hedging pressure has emphasized the costs (see, e.g., Hirshleifer (1990) and the references
therein).
12The implications of our model are robust to introducing a similar deadweight cost also in debt markets.
Please see the discussion on robustness following Proposition 6.
9cannot condition the debt contract on a particular realization of . This assumption reﬂects
the idea that at the ex ante contracting stage it may not be known which business risks the
ﬁrm needs to or can hedge in the future, and what derivative positions will be required to
do so. Essentially, this assumption rules out a fully state-contingent contract between the
creditor and the ﬁrm that ‘bundles’ ﬁnancing and hedging at date 0, which is in line with
the literature on incomplete contracting.13
Derivatives have economic value in our setting, since the correlation between the deriv-
ative payoﬀ and the ﬁrm’s operational risk can be used to reduce the ﬁrm’s default risk. In
particular, because income from a derivative position is veriﬁable, the derivative can be used
to decrease the variability of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow at date 1.T h i se ﬀectively raises the veriﬁ-
able cash ﬂow the ﬁrm has available at date 1. From a welfare perspective this is beneﬁcial,
because by raising the low date 1 cash ﬂow, the derivative may allow the ﬁrm to reduce the
probability of default at date 1. When the derivative is a perfect hedge, it may even allow
the ﬁrm to ﬁnance the project using risk-free debt, completely eliminating default. This
reduction in (or elimination of) the probability of default is socially beneﬁcial, because it
reduces the probability that the ﬁrm is terminated ineﬃciently at date 1. In the presence of
derivatives, the date 2 cash ﬂow 2 is thus lost less often, leading to a potential increase in
surplus. Derivatives increase surplus whenever the gains from more eﬃcient continuation at
date 1 outweigh the cost of using derivatives, which is captured by the deadweight hedging
cost (·).
Note that our formal description of derivatives contracts implicitly assumes that the ﬁrm
13For a more formal justiﬁcation of this assumption, assume that there is a continuum of -variables that
may potentially be used to hedge the ﬁrm’s business risk, but that at the ex-ante contracting stage it is not
yet known which of these potential -variables will be the relevant one from a risk management perspective.
However, once the ﬁrm is in operation and learns more about its business environment it can determine the
relevant variable . This lack of knowledge on the relevant random variable  ex ante, would eﬀectively
prevent the ﬁrm from contracting on a particular derivative position, or from making the debt contract
contingent on the relevant -variable. It is then more plausible that the ﬁrm will choose its derivative
position only after signing the initial debt contract. Note that this assumption also broadly reﬂects current
market practice. Firms usually choose their derivative exposure for a given amount of debt only ex post.
Moreover, in practice few (if any) bonds or loans include restrictions on future derivatives positions taken
by the debtor.
10faces no counterparty risk with respect to the payment by the derivative writer, .W e
will make this simplifying assumption throughout the analysis, as our focus is primarily
on counterparty and credit risk emanating from the ﬁrm to its creditors and the derivative
writer, i.e., with respect to the ﬁrm’s repayment of face value of debt  and the derivative
premium .14.
As discussed in Section 1, under current U.S. bankruptcy law, any cash (or securities) that
has been assigned by the ﬁrm as collateral to the derivatives writer in a margin account may
be collected by the derivative writer if the ﬁrm defaults on its debt (or seeks bankruptcy
protection). Typically, swaps and derivatives contracts will contain termination clauses,
which bring forward the settlement of the contract to the time when the ﬁrm defaults. In
practice, settlement then simply takes the form of the derivatives writer taking possession
of the cash collateral in the margin account. Importantly, under current U.S. bankruptcy
law, derivatives are exempt from the automatic stay that prevents collection of collateral for
secured debtholders. This exemption provides a key seniority protection to derivatives that
is not available to debtholders. However, any cash the ﬁrm holds that has not been assigned
as collateral to a derivatives counterparty when the ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy is stayed under
chapter 11.15 In addition, any cash that has been assigned as collateral to a creditor is also
stayed.
This automatic stay exemption in bankruptcy has particular bite for ﬁnancial ﬁrms
(banks), for which it is more diﬃcult to shield cash from derivative counterparties. By
the very nature of their business, it is too costly for banks to assign cash as collateral to
their depositors and other creditors, and thereby contractually guarantee that creditors are
always senior to derivatives counterparties. Assigning cash collateral in this way would sim-
14Note, however, that the basis risk on the derivatives contract could also be interpreted as counterparty
risk. For models that explicitly model counterparty risk emanating from the protection seller, see Thompson
(2010) and Biais, Heider, and Hoerova (2010).
15Similarly, under the current FDIC resolution process there essentially no stay on derivative contracts.
If not transferred to a new counterparty by 5pm EST on the business day after after the FDIC has been
appointed receiver, derivative, swap, and repo counterparties can close out their positions and take possession
of collateral. See, for example, Summe (2010, p.66).
11ply negate their value added as ﬁnancial intermediaries. What is more, once a bank is drained
of its cash reserves it ceases to operate. The diﬃculty for banks is then that any cash that
is left unassigned ex ante may be assigned as collateral to derivative counterparties ex post,
either as initial margins or through margin calls (variation margin) by derivatives counter-
parties. Therefore, the exemption from the automatic stay for derivatives oﬀers derivatives
counterparties a form of statutory seniority protection in ﬁnancial ﬁr m st h a ti sd i ﬃcult for
these ﬁrms to undo contractually.
I nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w em o d e lt h es e n i o r i t yo fd e r i v a t i v e sb yﬁrst considering two extreme
cases; ﬁrst the case where derivatives are senior to debt and then the alternative extreme
case in which derivatives are junior. The former situation is one where the premium  is fully
collateralized, and where cash collateral in the amount of  can be seized by the derivative
counterparty in the event of a default on debt payments.16
In the other extreme case when derivatives are junior to debt, the premium  is simply
not collateralized. In other words, no cash collateral is assigned to the derivative. Moreover,
in this case the debt contract then speciﬁes that it is senior to the derivative claim in
bankruptcy. The key question in this polar case is whether the ﬁrm can commit not to
collateralize its derivative position. Under current U.S. bankruptcy law it is diﬃcult to make
such a commitment, for any amount of cash the ﬁrm assigns to a derivative counterparty
can simply be seized by the derivative writer when the ﬁrm ﬁles for bankruptcy. It is then
extremely diﬃcult to recover any cash collateral that has been improperly assigned to the
derivatives counterparty, so that the derivative is de facto senior. However, under diﬀerent
bankruptcy rules, for example if there was a general stay on all attempts to collect collateral,
16The cash the ﬁrm assigns as collateral to the derivatives margin account is obtained either from retained
earnings or from the initial investment by the creditor. Retained earnings can be modeled by assuming that
after the ﬁrm sinks the set-up cost  at date 0, the project ﬁrst yields a sure return 
1 at date 1−.A tt h a t
point it is still unknown whether the full period 1 return will be 
1 or 
1 ;t h a ti s ,t h eﬁrm only knows
that it will receive an incremental cash ﬂow at date 1 of ∆1 = 
1 − 
1 with probability ,a n d0 with
probability (1 − ). To hedge the risk with respect to this incremental cash ﬂow, the ﬁr mc a nt h e nt a k ea
derivative position by pledging cash collateral  ≤ 
1 . Alternatively, the cash collateral  can be obtained
from the creditor at date 0 by raising a total amount  +  from the creditor. Either way of modeling cash
collateral works in our setup.
12such a commitment may be contractually feasible.
Following the analysis of these two polar cases, we then also consider the more general,
intermediate case in which derivatives can be partially collateralized by only assigning a
limited cash collateral  ≤  to the derivatives counterparty. In this case, only the amount
 can be seized by the derivatives writer in the event of default. The remaining amount the
ﬁrm owes to the derivatives counterparty,  −  is then treated as a regular debt claim in
bankruptcy. For simplicity we will assume that this remainder is junior to the claims of the
debtholder. In practice, such a claim could be classiﬁed in the same priority class as debt.
We do not explicitly consider this case, since the pro-rata allocation of assets to derivative
counterparties and debtholders that arises in this case considerably complicates the formal
analysis, without yielding any substantive additional economic insights.
3 Benchmark: No Derivatives
We ﬁrst describe the equilibrium in the absence of a derivative market. The results from
this section will provide a useful benchmark case against which we can evaluate the eﬀects
of introducing derivative markets in Section 5.
In the absence of derivatives, the ﬁrm always defaults if the low cash ﬂow 
1 realizes at
date 1. We will refer to this outcome as a liquidity default.A s
1 ,t h el o wc a s hﬂow
is not suﬃcient to repay the face value of debt. Moreover, the date 2 cash ﬂow 2 is not
pledgeable, and since the ﬁrm has no other cash it can oﬀer to renegotiate with the creditor,
the ﬁrm has no other option than to default when 
1 is realized at date 1. The lender then
seizes the cash ﬂow 
1 and shuts down the ﬁrm, collecting the liquidation value of the asset
. Early termination of the project leads to a social loss of 2 −, the additional cash ﬂow
that would have been generated had the ﬁrm been allowed to continue its operations.
If the high cash ﬂow 
1 realizes at date 1,t h eﬁrm has enough cash to service its debt.
However, the ﬁrm may still choose not to repay its debt. We refer to this choice as a strategic
13default. A strategic default occurs when the ﬁrm is better oﬀ defaulting on its debt at date
1 than repaying the debt and continuing operations until date 2. In particular, the ﬁrm will
make the contractual repayment  only if the following incentive constraint is satisﬁed:






1 +  (2)
where  denotes the surplus that the ﬁrm can extract in renegotiation after defaulting
strategically at date 1. The constraint (2) says that, when deciding whether to repay ,
the ﬁrm compares the payoﬀ from making the contractual payment and collecting the entire
date 2 cash ﬂow 2 to the payoﬀ from defaulting strategically, pocketing 
1 − 
1 and any
potential surplus  from renegotiating with the creditor. Repayment of the face value  in




1 + 2 −  (3)
The surplus  that the ﬁrm can extract in renegotiation with the creditor after a strategic
default depends on the speciﬁc assumptions made about the possibility of renegotiation and
the relative bargaining powers when renegotiation takes place. To keep things simple, we
will assume that the creditor can commit not to renegotiate with the debtor and will always
liquidate the ﬁrm after a strategic default. In this case,  =0 .17
When the incentive constraint (2) is satisﬁed, the lender’s breakeven constraint (under
our simplifying assumption  =0 )i sg i v e nb y
 +( 1− )

1 =  (4)
17This assumption is not crucial for our analysis. We could alternatively assume that renegotiation is
possible after a strategic default. For example, one could imagine a scenario in which the ﬁrm has full
bargaining power in renegotiation. In this case, after a strategic default, the ﬁrm would oﬀer 
1 + to the
creditor, making him just indiﬀerent between liquidating the ﬁrm and letting the ﬁrm continue. The surplus
from renegotiation to the ﬁrm would then be given by  = 2 − a n dt h ep r o j e c tc a nb eﬁnanced whenever
 
1 + . As we show in Appendix B, with slight adjustments, our results on the priority ranking of
derivatives relative to debt (Section 5) also carry through in this alternative speciﬁcation.
14which, given competitive debt markets, leads to an equilibrium face value of debt of
 =




Inserting this value of  into (3) we ﬁnd that the project can be ﬁnanced as long as
 ≤  ≡ 

1 + 2 (5)
The social surplus generated in the absence of derivatives is equal to the ﬁrm’s expected









1 −  (6)
We summarize the credit market outcome in the absence of derivatives in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 1 In the absence of derivative markets, the ﬁrm can ﬁnance the project as long
as  ≤  ≡ 
1 +2. When the project can attract ﬁnancing, the face value of debt is given
by  =
£
 − (1 − )
1
¤







Most importantly for the remainder of the paper, Proposition 1 establishes that, in the
absence of derivatives, the ﬁrm is always shut down after a low cash ﬂow realization at date
1. This early termination results in loss of the date 2 cash ﬂow 2, which means that the
equilibrium is ineﬃcient relative to the ﬁrst-best (full commitment) outcome. As we will
show in the following section, derivatives can reduce this ineﬃciency by reducing the risk of
d e f a u l ta td a t e1.
154 Financing with Derivatives: No Basis Risk
We ﬁr s tf o c u so nt h es i m p l ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ed e r i v a t i v eh a sn ob a s i sr i s k . U s i n gt h e
notation introduced above, this corresponds to the situation where  =1 ,s ot h a tt h eﬁrm
can completely eliminate default risk by choosing an appropriate position in the derivative.
We will analyze this case in two steps. We ﬁrst assume that when entering the debt contract
the ﬁrm can commit to the derivative position it will take ex post. As we will see, in this
benchmark case, the ﬁrm always takes the socially optimal hedging position and the priority
o r d e r i n go ft h ed e r i v a t i v er e l a t i v et od e b ti si r r e l e v a n t .W et h e na n a l y z et h ec a s ei nw h i c h
the ﬁrm cannot commit to a derivative position it might take ex-post. In that case, we will
see that the ﬁrm’s private incentives to hedge are suboptimal. Moreover, making derivatives
senior opens the door to ex-post debt dilution in the form of speculative short positions in
the derivative, rather than long hedging positions. If the ﬁrm cannot commit not to enter
such short derivative positions then making derivatives junior to debt is eﬃcient because it
discourages such ex-post dilution and leads to optimal hedging decisions by the ﬁrm for a
strictly larger set of parameters.
4.1 No Basis Risk under Full Commitment
Let us ﬁrst assume that, when entering the debt contract with the creditor, the ﬁrm can fully
commit to the derivative position it will choose ex post. In this case, the ﬁrm’s incentives
will be to maximize overall surplus: both the creditor and the derivative counterparty will
just break even, and all remaining surplus is captured by the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm will thus choose
to hedge whenever it is socially optimal to do so and, since the derivative is costly, when
hedging is optimal the ﬁrm will always take the minimum position in the derivative that is
needed to eliminate default.
We can also immediately see that in this case the priority ranking of debt relative to the
derivative is irrelevant from an eﬃciency standpoint. Whenever the ﬁrm chooses to hedge,
16debt becomes risk free and default will never occur. But when there is never any default,
the bankruptcy treatment of debt relative to derivatives is irrelevant.
We see this more formally by comparing the costs and beneﬁts from hedging in either
regime. Eliminating default leads to a gain of (1 − )2, since now the ﬁrm can be kept
alive even after the low date 1 cash ﬂow. The net cost of eliminating default is given by
the deadweight cost that needs to be incurred in derivative markets. Since the derivative
completely eliminates default when there is no basis risk, debt becomes safe, such that  = ,
irrespective of the priority ranking of debt relative to derivatives. Hence, the deadweight
cost of taking the required derivative position  =  −






chooses to hedge whenever the presence of derivatives raises surplus, which is the case when







This is satisﬁed whenever the continuation or going concern value of the ﬁrm 2 is suﬃciently
large, or when the cost of hedging is suﬃciently low.
Proposition 2 When the derivative has no basis risk ( =1 )and the ﬁrm can commit to
a derivative position when entering the debt contract:
1. The ﬁrm chooses the socially optimal derivative position
2. The bankruptcy treatment of derivatives is irrelevant






4.2 No Basis Risk under Limited Commitment
Consider now the case where the ﬁrm cannot commit to a derivative position when entering
the debt contract with the creditor. As we will see, the priority ranking of debt relative to
derivatives may now matter. As before, the bankruptcy treatment of seniority of debt versus
derivatives is irrelevant when the ﬁrm chooses the minimum derivative position required for
17hedging,  =  − 
1 . However, when the ﬁrm cannot commit to a derivative position,
its private ex-post incentives to hedge are lower than the social incentives. Taking the face
value of debt  =  as given, it is in the ﬁrm’s ex post interest to eliminate credit risk by
choosing a derivative position of  =  − 
1 whenever







Comparing this condition to (7) we see that under no commitment the ﬁrm’s incentives to
hedge are strictly lower than is socially optimal. This is simply another illustration of the
well-known observation that equityholders have suboptimal hedging incentives once debt is
in place.
As long as the ﬁrm can only take long positions in the derivative, the hedging incentives
a r ei n d e p e n d e n to ft h eb a n k r u p t c yt r e a t m e nt of derivatives. If, on the other hand, we
allow the ﬁrm to take short positions in the derivative, an additional eﬀect emerges and the
bankruptcy treatment starts to matter. In particular, if the derivative contract is senior, the
ﬁrm is able to dilute the creditor by taking a short position in the derivative. By doing so,
the ﬁrm transfers resources that would usually accrue to the creditor in the default state into
the high cash ﬂow state, in which they accrue to the equityholder. Hence, under seniority
for derivatives, a derivative that could function as a perfect hedge may well be deployed as
a vehicle for speculation or risk-shifting.





 0, so that it would be socially
optimal for the ﬁrm to hedge. Under senior derivatives, we now have to compare the ﬁrms
payoﬀ f r o mh e d g i n gt ot h ep a y o ﬀ from taking no derivatives position, and also the payoﬀ to
taking a short position in the derivative. As it turns out, the ﬁrm’s incentives are such that
it always (weakly) prefers taking a short position in the derivative to taking no position at
all. Therefore, the ﬁrm will hedge in equilibrium only if the payoﬀs from hedging exceed the
payoﬀs from speculation by taking a short position. Comparing these payoﬀs, we see that
18hedging is now privately optimal if, and only if,











1  0 (9)
The additional term relative to (8) shows that hedging is harder to sustain when short
positions in the derivative are possible. In addition, in cases where no position in the
derivative is optimal, under senior derivatives the ﬁrm now always takes an ineﬃcient short
position in the derivative.
Proposition 3 When the derivative has no basis risk ( =1 )and the ﬁrm cannot commit
to a derivative position when entering the debt contract
1. The ﬁrm’s private incentives to hedge are strictly less than the social incentives to
hedge.
2. When only long positions in the derivative are possible, the bankruptcy treatment of
derivatives does not matter for eﬃciency.
3. When the ﬁrm can take short ‘speculative’ positions in the derivative, the bankruptcy
treatment of derivatives matters: Under senior derivatives, the ﬁr mm a yc h o o s et o
take a speculative position in the derivative to dilute its creditors. This is strictly
ineﬃc i e n ta n dr e s t r i c t st h es e to fp a r a m e t e r sf o rw h i c ht h ee ﬃcient hedging position
can be sustained.
Proposition 3 illustrates, in the simplest possible setting, one of the ﬁrst-order ineﬃcien-
cies of senior derivatives: Rather than being used as hedging tools, seniority for derivatives
may lead ﬁrms to channel funds away from creditors, in a form of risk shifting. This is not
possible when derivatives are treated as junior to debt.
195 Financing with Derivatives: Basis Risk
We now extend our analysis to the case where the derivative contract has basis risk (
1) and present the main results of our analysis. We ﬁrst establish a preliminary lemma
about collateralization of derivatives positions. In particular, Lemma 1 states that once
the face value of debt has been set, in the presence of basis risk it is always optimal ex
post to maximally collateralize the derivative contract. The reason is that once  is ﬁxed,
collateralization of the derivative contract makes hedging cheaper for the ﬁrm.
Lemma 1 Once ﬁnancing has been secured and the face value of debt  h a sb e e ns e t ,i ti s
optimal to fully collateralize the derivative position ex post. This is because, the cost of the




Lemma 1 illustrates the conventional wisdom supporting the collateralization and eﬀec-
tive seniority of derivatives: collateralization and seniority for derivatives makes hedging
cheaper, which beneﬁts the ﬁrm. By this rationale, it is often also argued that full collater-
alization and the concomitant seniority of derivative contracts is optimal, and that reducing
collateralization or making derivative contracts junior to debt is undesirable, as it raises the
cost of the derivative to the ﬁrm and makes hedging more expensive.
However, as we will argue below, changing the level of collateralization of derivatives,
while holding the face value of outstanding debt constant is not the correct thought experi-
ment. After all, in the event of default, debtholders and derivative counterparties hold claims
on the same pool of assets. Varying the collateralization of derivatives must in equilibrium
also have an impact on the pricing of the ﬁrm’s debt. In fact, we will show below that once
we allow the ﬁrm’s terms in the debt market to adjust in response to the level of collateral-
ization in derivatives markets, the argument for full collateralization and eﬀective seniority
for derivatives is reversed.
20We show this by ﬁrst considering the two extreme cases: senior derivatives and junior
derivatives. These extreme cases contain most of the intuition for why it may be more
eﬃcient to make derivatives junior once we take into account the adjustment of the ﬁrm’s
borrowing costs in response to the treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy. We later show
that this result generalizes to the intermediate case in which derivatives can be partially
collateralized.
As before, let us initially assume that the ﬁrm can commit to taking the optimal (i.e.,
surplus-maximizing) derivative position in any given priority structure. This abstracts away
from the ﬁrm’s potential incentive to take on an excessively large derivative position if the
derivative dilutes existing debtholders. We will come back to the issue of dilution through
excessively large derivative positions in Section 5.5, where we show that seniority for deriv-
atives can lead ﬁrms to take on excessively large derivative positions.
5.1 Senior Derivatives under Full Commitment
Senior derivatives (full collateralization of derivatives) is the natural starting point for our
analysis because it most accurately reﬂects the current special bankruptcy status of deriva-
tives discussed in Section 1. The required premium  for a derivative position of a notional
size of , is determined by the counterparty’s breakeven constraint. When derivatives are
s e n i o r ,t h ed e r i v a t i v ec o u n t e r p a r t yi sa l w a y sp a i di nf u l la sl o n ga s ≤ 
1 . The derivative
counterparty then receives a payment of  whenever  = , which happens with proba-
bility .W h e n  
1 , on the other hand, the counterparty cannot be fully repaid when
the ﬁrm defaults, and then, as the senior claimant, receives the entire cash ﬂow 
1 .I nt h e
interest of brevity, we will focus on the ﬁrst case,  ≤ 
1 , in the main text. The second case
is covered in the appendix.
For the counterparty to break even, the expected payment received must equal the ex-
pected payments made,  (1 − ) p l u st h ed e a d w e i g h tc o s to fh e d g i n g(). The breakeven
21constraint is thus given by
 =  (1 − )+() (11)
which yields a cost of the derivative of
 =
(1 − ) + ()

 (12)
The face value of debt, , is determined by the creditor’s breakeven condition. When
derivatives are senior to the creditor and  ≤ 
1 , this breakeven condition is given by







This condition states that the expected payments received by the creditor must equal the
initial outlay  Note that the seniority of the derivative contract becomes relevant in the
state when 1 = 
1 and  = , which occurs with probability (1 − )(1− ).I n t h a t
case, the derivative counterparty is paid its contractual obligation  before the creditor can
receive any payment. This leads to a face value of debt of
 =





[ +( 1− )]
 (14)
T h ed e r i v a t i v ec a nb eav a l u a b l eh e d g i n gt o o lf o rt h eﬁrm. In particular, when  =1
the derivative is a perfect hedge against the cash ﬂow risk at date 1, such that the ﬁrm can
completely eliminate default by taking a suitable position in the derivative market. When
1, the derivative is only a partial hedge, as it sometimes does not pay  when 1 = 
1
and sometimes pays  when 1 = 
1 . Nevertheless, hedging can still be valuable for the
ﬁrm. While the derivative cannot eliminate default, it can still reduce the probability of
d e f a u l ta td a t e1.W h e n 1, debt remains risky even under hedging. Moreover, since
default occurs with positive probability when 1, the seniority of derivatives relative to
debt contracts is then relevant: in states in which the ﬁrm defaults and owes payments to
22both the creditor and protection seller, the protection seller will get paid ﬁrst.
When hedging in the derivative market, under full commitment the optimal derivative
position for the ﬁrm is the one that just eliminates default when the date 1 cash ﬂow is low
and the derivative pays .T h i si sa c h i e v e db ys e t t i n g
 =  − 

1 .( 1 5 )
Setting  = −
1  t h ed e r i v a t i v ec o n t r a c tj u s te l i m i n a t e sd e f a u l ti ns t a t e sw h e n1 = 
1
and  =  (with probability (1 − )). Increasing the derivative position beyond this level
does not generate any additional surplus; it only increases the deadweight hedging cost 
a n di st h u si n e ﬃcient. As the derivative is an imperfect hedge, the ﬁrm still defaults when
1 = 
1 and  =  (with probability (1 − )(1− )). Using (12), (14), and (15) we can
characterize the equilibrium under senior derivatives as follows.
Proposition 4 Senior derivatives. Assume that derivatives are senior and that  ≤ 
1 .
Under full commitment, the optimal derivative position is given by
 =  − 

1  (16)
This leads to a an equilibrium face value of
 =
 − (1 + )(1− )(1− )
1
 − (1 + )(1− )(1− )
 (17)
and cost of the derivative of
 =





 − (1 + )(1− )(1− )
 (18)
To gain intuition on the above results it is useful to consider the special case in which
derivatives provide a perfect hedge against the cash ﬂow risk at date 1 ( =1 ). In this
23case, debt becomes risk-free ( = ), so that the optimal derivative position is given by
 =  − 
1 . When the derivative is not a perfect hedge (1), on the other hand,
debt remains risky even in the presence of derivatives () and the required derivative
position increases to  − 
1 − 
1 .
The social surplus generated in the presence of derivatives depends on how eﬀective
derivatives are at hedging the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow risks. In particular, when the derivative has
more basis risk (lower ), this reduces the eﬀectiveness of the derivative as a hedging tool
and thus the probability of continuation of the ﬁrm at date 1,  +( 1− ). In addition,
basis risk increases the costs of eliminating default, since the required derivative position,
 − 
1  is strictly larger than the derivative position required in the absence of basis risk.
Corollary 1 Social surplus. The social surplus when the ﬁrm chooses a derivative position
of  =  − 
1 is given by

 +( 1− )








Derivatives raise social surplus relative to the outcome without derivatives when the gain
from a greater likelihood of continuation of (1 − ) outweighs the hedging cost:







where  is given by (17). When hedging costs are linear, this is satisﬁed whenever the hedging
cost is not too large:

∗ =
(1 − )[ − (1 − )(1 − )]2
(1 − )(1 − )22 + ( − 
1 )
. (21)
Assume for now that (20) is satisﬁed, so that derivatives can indeed add value. When
(20) is satisﬁed, the socially optimal derivative position is given by  =  − 
1 .W h e n
(20) is violated, on the other hand, it is optimal for the ﬁrm not to use derivatives at all.
24Corollary 1 shows that derivatives add value as long as the hedging cost  is suﬃciently low,
or equivalently, as long as the setup cost  is not too large. The respective critical values
for  or  depend on the derivative’s basis risk. In particular, when basis risk increases






. While the reduction in beneﬁts from derivatives is immediate from (20), the
increase in the cost of derivatives arises from the higher required face value  for lower .
This, in turn, implies that a larger derivative position is necessary in order to eliminate
default in the states in which 1 = 
1 and  =  thus raising the cost of managing risk
through derivatives. Hence, an increase in basis risk implies that derivatives add value for a
strictly smaller set of combinations of hedging and setup costs.
5.2 Junior Derivatives under Full Commitment
We now consider the opposite extreme case, junior derivatives. As before, default by the
ﬁrm occurs in the low cash ﬂow state at date 1 when the derivative bet does not pay oﬀ.
This happens again with probability (1 − )(1− ). Under seniority for derivatives, the
protection seller was fully repaid in this state. This changes when derivatives are junior.
Now the lender receives the entire cash ﬂow 
1 in default, whereas the protection seller
receives nothing. This changes the protection seller’s breakeven constraint, since now the
protection seller only receives the premium  with probability [ − (1 − )(1− )]rather
than with probability . The protection seller’s breakeven constraint is now given by







(where the superscript  refers to the fact that debt is senior), which yields

 =
(1 − ) + 
¡
¢
 − (1 − )(1− )
 (23)
Debt is still risky, but since the creditor is now senior to the derivative counterparty, he
25receives the entire cash ﬂow in the default state, so that the creditor’s breakeven constraint
becomes
[ +( 1− )]
 +( 1− )(1− )

1 =  (24)




 − (1 − )(1− )
1
 +( 1− )
 (25)
B yt h es a m ea r g u m e n ta sb e f o r e ,d e f a u l tc a nb ee l i m i n a t e di nt h es t a t ew h e r e1 = 
1 and






As before, default still occurs when 1 = 
1 and  =  w h e nt h ed e r i v a t i v ei sa n
imperfect hedge. We can now use (23), (25) and (26) to characterize the equilibrium under
junior derivatives.
Proposition 5 Junior derivatives. Assume that derivatives are junior. Under full com-






This leads to an equilibrium face value of

 =
 − (1 − )(1− )
1
 +  (1 − )
 (28)
and cost of the derivative of

 =





[ − (1 − )(1− )][ +  (1 − )]
 (29)
26Analogously to before, we can use the results from Proposition 5 to calculate the surplus
when derivatives are junior.
Corollary 2 With junior derivatives, social surplus is given by

 +( 1− )









When derivatives are junior, the introduction of derivatives raises social surplus relative to
the outcome without derivatives whenever








where  is given by (28). When hedging costs are linear, this is satisﬁed whenever the
hedging cost is not too large:

∗∗ =




Proposition 5 and Corollary 2 contain the key economic insight of our analysis. When
debt is senior, the required face value on the debt  is lower than when derivatives are
senior. In other words, when debt is senior to derivatives, the ﬁrm’s cost of debt is lower
despite the fact that the ﬁrm’s hedging costs are higher. This is a striking result, which is
robust to many changes in the model, and which is not entirely obvious a priori. The fact
that the cost of debt is lower even though hedging costs are higher is critical, in particular,
because according to (27) it implies that the size of the optimal derivative position is lower
than when derivatives are senior. Indeed, from Corollaries 1 and 2 it is easy to observe
that the optimal derivative position under senior debt,  −
1  is smaller than the optimal
derivative position under senior derivatives. As the deadweight cost of hedging is directly
proportional to the size of the hedging position, it follows that the increase in the cost of
debt that results when derivatives are senior reduces surplus. This is summarized in the
27following proposition.
Proposition 6 Comparing surplus under junior and senior derivatives. Relative
to the case without derivatives, junior derivatives are more likely to raise surplus than senior
derivatives. When deadweight costs of hedging costs are linear, in particular, hedging with
junior derivatives increases surplus for all  ≤ 
∗∗ while hedging with senior derivatives





In addition, when hedging adds value both with senior and junior derivatives, surplus under
junior derivatives is unambiguously higher than with senior derivatives. With linear hedging






(1 − )(1− )(1−  + )
[ +  (1 − )][ − (1 + )(1− )(1− )]
≥ 0 (33)
Thus, the received wisdom that full collateralization and seniority of derivatives is de-
sirable (Lemma 1) reverses once one takes into account the eﬀects of collateralization of
derivatives on the cost of debt. Proposition 6 shows that derivatives are more likely to add
value when they are junior as opposed to when they are senior. Moreover, surplus is always
higher under junior derivatives than under senior derivatives, except in two special cases.
First, when the derivative is a perfect hedge ( =1 ), the ﬁrm never defaults, so that se-
niority of the derivative contract is irrelevant. Second, when there is no deadweight hedging
cost ( =0 ) seniority is irrelevant because of the Modigliani-Miller theorem: in frictionless
markets, capital structure does not matter.
Robustness. The superiority of junior derivatives that is established in Proposition 6 is
robust to a number of variations in the assumptions of our model. Most importantly, we want
to stress that our result is not driven by the fact that there is a deadweight cost of hedging
in the derivative markets, but no deadweight cost in the debt markets. The easiest way to
28see this is to consider the reverse case of what we have assumed up to now: if there was a
cost of risk only in the debt market, but not in the derivative market, it would obviously
also be optimal to make debt senior, in order to minimize the risk borne by the debtholder.
By the same logic, in a model in which there is a cost of risk both in debt and derivatives
markets, the cost of risk in the debt market creates an additional reason why debt should be
senior: when debt is senior, this minimizes the cost of hedging in the debt market (and thus
the required face value of debt), which in turn minimizes the required derivative position,
and thus the hedging cost in the derivative market.
T os e et h i sm o r es p e c i ﬁcally, consider the following example, in which we treat risk in
the debt and derivative markets completely symmetrically and still obtain our main result.
Assume that parties in each market (the creditor and the counterparty) incur a cost that
is proportional to the potential loss they face when their contracts move against them. As
before, for the counterparty this cost is proportional to . For the creditor, this cost is
proportional to the loss in case of default, which is given by  − 
1 −  when derivatives
are senior and  − 
1 when derivatives are junior. It is straightforward to see that making
derivatives junior reduces the hedging cost in both markets.
Alternatively, one could also impose a symmetric deadweight cost that is proportional
to the volatility of the derivative and the debt contract payoﬀ, respectively. While this is
somewhat less tractable than our baseline model, under this speciﬁcation the ranking of
junior and senior derivatives presented in Proposition 6 is also preserved.
The one change that could reverse the superiority of junior derivatives in the context
of our model is a potential regime shift in derivatives markets following the removal of the
special treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy. More speciﬁcally, our analysis assumes that
the priority treatment of derivatives relative to debt results in a transfer of counterparty
risk from one market to the other. While treating counterparty risk symmetrically in this
fashion is the natural starting point for our analysis, it is conceivable that following the
removal of the privilege there might be a discontinuous increase in the deadweight cost of
29hedging counterparty risk for the derivatives writer: from () to, say,  ()  ().
However, while counterparty risk in the derivative market is likely to increase following
the removal of the privilege, it is not obvious that the increase risk will lead to signiﬁcant
increases in deadweight costs. For the typical ﬁrm the derivatives writer may face only a
small increase in the probability of non-payment of the premium . This small increase in
risk would of course result in a higher premium, as is the case in our analysis. However, by
far the biggest risk derivatives writers would continue to face is with respect to the payment
 which is due when  is realized. This risk and the cost of hedging this risk (say, by
holding more capital or purchasing credit default swap protection) is largely unrelated to
the risk of non-payment of the premium, and therefore it is unclear why there would be a
structural shift in the deadweight cost ().
5.3 Partial Collateralization
Having compared the polar cases of senior and junior derivatives, we now characterize the
equilibrium for the more general case of partial collateralization of the derivative contract.
Under partial collateralization, the ﬁrm pledges a maximum amount  ≤  of collateral to
the derivative counterparty.
Since the steps required to calculate the equilibrium are analogous to the discussion in
the two polar cases, we illustrate them in the appendix. Intuitively, partial collateralization
makes the derivative contract senior up to the maximum amount  ≤ . For the remaining
amount −, derivative counterparties are not collateralized and hold a regular debt claim.
For simplicity we assume that this remaining claim is junior to the debtholder. As in the
two polar cases discussed above, an increase in collateralization reduces the cost of the
derivative, but increases the ﬁrm’s cost of debt. We characterize the equilibrium for a
general collateralization amount  in Proposition 7 below.
Proposition 7 Partial collateralization. When the derivative is partially collateralized
30up to an amount  ≤ , the optimal derivative position is given by
 ()=() − 

1  (34)
This leads to an equilibrium face value of
()=





 +  (1 − )
 (35)
and a cost of the derivative of
()=





− (1 − )(1− )[ − (1 − )(1− ) − ]
[ − (1 − )(1− )][ +  (1 − )]
 (36)
Proposition 7 shows that the case of partial collateralization lies between the two extreme
cases above. We see that as collateralization increases, the cost of the derivative, (),
decreases. At the same time, however, the required face value of debt increases, as an
increase in collateralization of the derivative makes the debt contract riskier. This also
means that the required derivative position, () − 
1 , is monotonically increasing in the
level of collateralization of the derivative.
This proposition shows that the surplus results from the extreme cases of senior and
junior derivatives extend to a general setup with partial collateralization. In particular, as
the equilibrium face value of debt rises when derivatives are more collateralized, the required
derivative position is larger. This reduces total surplus because the ﬁrm has to incur a larger
hedging cost to eliminate default.
Corollary 3 Surplus with partial collateralization. The surplus generated by the intro-
duction of derivatives is decreasing in the level of collateralization of the derivative contract.
315.4 Default due to Derivative Losses
Up to now we have (implicitly) assumed that the required debt and derivative payment are
such that the ﬁrm meets its payment obligations when the ﬁrm receives the high cash ﬂow

1 , but the derivative moves against the ﬁrm. While this helped simplify our analysis, this
assumption is not innocuous. The reason is that the required payment ()+() may
in fact exceed the available cash, such that the ﬁrm cannot meet its payment obligation,
or alternatively, ()+() may be such that the ﬁrm has an incentive not to make its
contractual payments and default. We now show that default due to derivative losses is more
likely, the higher is the level of collateralization.
The possibility of default due to derivative losses also implies that derivatives can serve
as hedging tools only if the ex ante setup cost lies below a cutoﬀ value  (). This cutoﬀ
value is decreasing in the level of collateralization, which means that derivatives can serve
as hedging tools for a larger set of ex-ante projects when there is less collateralization.
The reason behind this result is again that a higher level of collateralization of the
derivative contract leads to a larger overall required payment ()+() in states where
t h ed e r i v a t i v em o v e sa g a i n s tt h eﬁrm. While more collateralization generally decreases the
cost of the derivative (), this is more than outweighed by the concomitant increase in the
face value of debt (). This makes default more likely because it increases the chance of
fundamental or strategic default in the state when the ﬁrm receives the high cash ﬂow, but
the derivative moves against the ﬁrm.
Proposition 8 Default due to losses on the derivative position. The ﬁrm meets its
payment obligations when it receives the high cash ﬂow but the derivative moves against the


















(1 − )(1− )
[ − (1 − )(1− )][ +  (1 − )]
 0 (38)
Proposition 8 shows that both fundamental and strategic default are more likely when
the derivative is more highly collateralized. This also implies that
Corollary 4 Derivatives can be used to hedge the low cash ﬂow state without causing default
in the high cash ﬂow state as long as
 ≤  ()=Γ0










where Γ0 and Γ1 are positive constants and
Γ2 =
(1 − )(1− )
 +  (1 − )+
(40)
Since Γ2 ≥ 0,  () is decreasing in the level of collateralization.
5.5 Limited Commitment: Hedging or Speculation?
In this section we relax the assumption that the ﬁr mc a nc o m m i tt oa ne x - p o s td e r i v a t i v e
position and investigate another potential ineﬃciency that can result from the preferential
treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy: if the ﬁrm cannot commit to taking an appropriate
derivative position, it may choose ex post to take speculative derivative positions at the
expense of creditors. We illustrate this motive for ineﬃcient speculation when derivatives
are senior to debt, for parameter values such that the ﬁrm ﬁnds it ex post privately optimal
to hedge its cash ﬂow risk in the derivative market. This is essentially the case when 2 is
suﬃciently large. Recall that if hedging is optimal, a social planner would always choose a
derivative position that just eliminates default:  =  − 
1 ,w h e r e i st h ef a c ev a l u ea t
which the creditor breaks even given the derivative payoﬀ . This face value is given by
equation (17).
33Now consider the ﬁrm’s ex-post private incentives to take a hedging position  when
derivatives are senior. If 2 is large enough that the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to eliminate default,
it would never want to take a derivative position that is smaller than −
1 . Under senior
derivatives it may, however, have an incentive to take a derivative position that strictly
exceeds  − 
1 , which is ineﬃcient given the deadweight cost of hedging. To see this,
consider the ﬁrm’s objective function with respect to hedging after it has already committed
to a debt repayment of , given below. If it is privately optimal for the ﬁrm to eliminate
the default state, the ﬁrm’s privately optimal derivative position  maximizes the ﬁrm’s































+[  +( 1− )]2 (41)
where the premium 
¡
¢
the ﬁrm pays for the derivative is determined by the protection
seller’s break-even constraint (11).
To see why the ﬁrm may over-speculate in derivatives markets, it is instructive to look
at the ﬁrm’s marginal payoﬀ from increasing its derivative position beyond  =  − 
1 :


















marginal cost of derivative
≷ 0 (42)
The ﬁrst term is the extra derivative payoﬀ to the ﬁrm from increasing its derivative
position by one unit beyond .I ti se q u a lt o(1−) because an increase in the derivative’s
notional value generates an additional dollar for the ﬁrm with probability (1−). The second
term is the share of the marginal cost of an additional unit of the derivative that is borne by
the ﬁrm. The full marginal cost of an additional unit in notional derivative exposure is given
by its actuarially fair marginal cost (1−) plus the increase in the hedging cost 0(−
1 ).
However, this cost is only borne by the ﬁrm in states in which it is the residual claimant.
34In the default state, the marginal cost of the derivative is paid by the creditor, since the
derivative is senior to debt. Thus, the ﬁrm does not internalize the full cost of increasing its
derivative position beyond , and therefore may have an incentive to over-speculate.
To illustrate this more explicitly, suppose that the deadweight hedging costs are linear:
()=. From (42), we then ﬁnd that the ﬁrm’s privately optimal derivative position
coincides with the optimal derivative position when the derivative has relatively little basis
risk  ≥ . When the derivative has signiﬁcant basis risk, , on the other hand, the ﬁrm
will enter a derivative position that is too large from a social perspective. This implies that
the ﬁrm will choose to over-speculate in derivatives markets whenever the derivative’s basis
risk is suﬃciently large. Given a linear hedging cost, when the ﬁrm chooses to over-speculate
it will choose a derivative position that completely expropriates the creditor in the default




1 ). This is summarized in the
following Proposition.
Proposition 9 Derivatives seniority and excessively large derivative positions.
Suppose that the deadweight cost of hedging is linear and given by ()=.S u p p o s e
also that it is privately optimal for the ﬁrm to hedge default risk via the derivative. Then,
when the ﬁrm cannot commit to a derivative position ex ante, the ﬁrm’s privately optimal
derivative position coincides with the optimal derivative position only if  ≥ .W h e n,
the ﬁrm enters a derivative position that is too large from a social perspective, where
 =1−

(1 − )(1 −  + )
 (43)






























The incentive to over-speculate in derivative markets disappears when derivatives are
junior to debt. To see this, consider the ﬁrm’s ex-post objective with respect to hedging
with junior derivatives. The ﬁrm’s surplus is unchanged relative to (41), except that the






(1 − ) + 
¡
¢
 − (1 − )(1− )
 (46)
Diﬀerentiating (41) and (46) with respect to  then reveals that with junior derivatives
the ﬁrm has no incentive to take an excessively large derivative position. Indeed, the mar-
ginal payoﬀ from increasing the derivative position beyond  =  − 






This is to be expected: with junior derivatives the ﬁrm bears the full marginal cost of
an additional unit of derivative exposure. Since the derivative is priced at actuarially fair
terms net of the deadweight hedging cost, on net the ﬁrm cannot gain from increasing its
derivative exposure beyond  − 
1 .
Proposition 10 Under junior derivatives there is no incentive to take excessively
large derivative positions. When derivatives are junior, the ﬁrm has no incentive to
over-speculate in derivative markets. When it is privately optimal for the ﬁrm to hedge, it
always chooses the eﬃcient derivative position.
One implication of our analysis is thus that under the current exemption of derivatives
from the automatic stay in bankruptcy, derivative markets may grow excessively large from
a social perspective. This is true even though derivatives are fundamentally value-enhancing
in our model as risk management tools. Another insight from our analysis is that the
36incentives to take on excessively large derivative positions are tightly linked to the basis
risk of the derivative contract available for hedging. When the derivative has no basis risk,
or when basis risk is suﬃciently small, the ﬁrm has no incentives to take excessively large
positions. When, on the other hand, there is a suﬃc i e n ta m o u n to fb a s i sr i s k ,t h eﬁrm may
have an incentive to take on excessive derivative positions, thereby diluting existing creditors.
Rather than being a hedging tool, the derivative then becomes a vehicle for speculation.
A natural question to ask is what would happen if the ﬁrm had a choice of derivative
instruments? Would it choose to hedge as much as possible by choosing little basis risk, or
would it choose to speculate at its creditors’ expense by choosing a derivative with more
basis risk? To answer this question, suppose that after signing the debt contract and after
identifying all the relevant hedging opportunites (i.e. after observing the relevant -variable),
the ﬁrm can choose among a number of derivative contracts that diﬀer in their basis risk:
 ∈ [minmax]. Suppose moreover, that max   min so that under the derivative
with minimum basis risk the eﬃcient hedging position could be sustained when derivatives
are senior, whereas with maximum basis risk the ﬁr mw o u l dh a v ea ni n c e n t i v et oc h o o s ea n
ineﬃciently large deriavtive position, as discussed in Proposition 9.
Observe ﬁr s tt h a tt h eﬁrm’s objective function (41) is linear in .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h e
ﬁrm’s optimal choice of  is a bang-bang policy: it is either optimal to choose  = max or
 = min. In the latter case the ﬁrm minimizes the hedging beneﬁto ft h ed e r i v a t i v ea n d
maximizes the dilution of existing creditors.
The ﬁrm’s incentives to engage in dilution by choosing the highest basis risk depend on
the seniority treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy. By diﬀerentiating (41) with respect to
, we can show that the choice of minimum basis risk ( = max)i se a s i e rt os u s t a i nw h e n
derivatives are junior than when they are senior. Moreover, when minimum basis risk cannot
be sustained under senior derivatives the ﬁrm then has an incentive to choose an ineﬃciently
large derivative position, as underlined in Proposition 9.
Proposition 11 Choice of basis risk. Assume that max   min.T h eﬁrm chooses
37the minimum basis risk derivative and the eﬃcient derivative position when derivatives are
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Condition (48) is strictly harder so satisfy than (47), which means that when derivatives
are senior to debt the ﬁrm has stronger incentives to choose maximum basis risk. Moreover,
when (48) is violated, the ﬁrm chooses maximum basis risk min and fully dilutes the creditor
by choosing a derivative position that is strictly larger than optimal.
Proposition 11 establishes, ﬁrst, that the ﬁrm has an incentive to choose the derivative
with minimum basis risk when 2 is suﬃciently large. Second, when 2 is small it is (ex-
post) optimal for the ﬁrm to choose a derivative instrument with maximum basis risk in order
to dilute existing creditors through speculation in the derivative market. Third, choosing
minimum basis risk is a more likely outcome when derivatives are junior than when they are
senior to debt. The intution for these results is twofold. First, when derivatives are junior,
the required derivative premium increases in basis risk because the derivative counterparty
is now less likey to get repaid in full. This decreases the incentive to increase basis risk.
Second, the notional derivative position required to hedge cash ﬂow risk is strictly smaller
under junior derivatives than under senior derivatives. This reduces the ﬁrm’s incentives to
move this derivative payoﬀ into the high cash ﬂow state at the expense of defaulting more
often. All in all, under junior derivatives the ﬁrm thus has less to gain from speculating by
choosing a position in a derivative with high basis risk.
So far, our discussion has focused on the case where it is privately optimal ex post for the
ﬁrm to hedge. But, what if the ﬁr m ’ si n c e n t i v e sa r es u c ht h a ti td o e sn o tw a n tt oh e d g ea t
38all ex post? In this case, it turns out that the current privileged treatment of derivatives may
have a beneﬁt. As is well known, once debt is in place, equityholders’ gain from hedging is
generally lower than the total gain to the ﬁrm, as the ﬁrm’s creditors also stand to gain from
the ﬁrm’s hedge. While shareholders’ private hedging incentives may generally be too low
irrespectively of whether derivatives are senior or junior to debt, it is possible that hedging
could only be sustained when derivatives are senior when 2 is relatively low. The reason
is that a senior derivative position dilutes existing creditors more, and therefore the ﬁrm
is more likely to hedge when the derivative is senior. More formally, it can be shown that
when derivatives are junior to debt it is privately optimal for the ﬁrm to hedge if 2  ¯ 2,
and when derivatives are senior to debt it is privately optimal for the ﬁrm to hedge when
2  ˜ 2. Depending on parameters, it is possible that ˜ 2  ¯ 2, so that there is a region
where the ﬁrm may only choose to hedge when derivatives are senior to debt. However,
note that this case necessarily lies in the region where hedging is less valuable (because it
occurs for low values of 2. Moreover, even in this case, the current privileged treatment
that applies to all derivatives is over-inclusive, since the potential beneﬁt from seniority only
arises for a small subset of parameter constellations.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a simple model to analyze in a tractable and transparent way the
implications of granting super-seniority protection to derivatives, swaps, and repos. These
protections have been put in place with the main objective of providing stability to derivatives
markets, without any systematic analysis of the likely consequences for ﬁrms’ overall costs
of borrowing and hedging incentives. The presumption of the ISDA and policy makers has
basically been that the eﬀects of super-protection of derivatives on ﬁrms’ cost of debt are
negligible and do not require any in-depth analysis. Our analysis suggests, however, that
the strengthening of derivatives’ treatment in bankruptcy may have been ineﬃcient. While
39seen in isolation the super-protection lowers the cost of hedging, this is more than oﬀset by a
greater cost of debt and a greater incentive to over-hedge. Based on our analysis, it appears
that, at a minimum, further research is required into the consequences for ﬁrms’ cost of
borrowing before one can conclude that the super-priority status of derivatives is warranted.
Our model also points at potential directions for future research. For example, one of
the main implications of our model is that, as long as the relocation of credit risk between
derivative markets and credit markets are mere transfers, making derivatives junior is more
eﬃcient than giving them eﬀective seniority. However, additional eﬀects may arise if moving
credit risk to the debt market leads to net surplus gains in the derivative markets, for example
by allowing standardization that is not possible in the absence of such seniority. We leave
these questions for future research.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: The steps needed to calculate the cost of the derivative as a function
of the level of collateralization  are given below in the section characterizing the equilibrium
under partial collateralization. Holding  ﬁxed and assuming that  ≤ 












− (1 − )(1− )
 − (1 − )(1− )
 (49)




(1 − )(1− )
 − (1 − )(1− )
 0
This means that when we take face value of debt as given, the cost of the derivative
is decreasing in the level of collateralization of the derivative as long as  ≤ 
1 .W h e n
 
1 , a further increase in collateralization does not change the payoﬀ of the derivative
40counterparty, such that in this region the cost of the derivative is unchanged.
Senior Derivatives when  
1 : In this section we describe the equilibrium under
senior derivatives when  
1 ,w h i c hw el e f to u ti nt h em a i nb o d yo ft h et e x tf o rs p a c e
considerations. The main diﬀerence to the case discussed in the text is that the equations
that the breakeven conditions for the derivative counterparty and the creditor change. When
 
1 ,w h e nt h eﬁrm defaults, the derivative counterparty receives the entire cash ﬂow,
while the creditor receives nothing. Hence, the equilibrium is characterized by





 +  (1 − )
(51)
 =
(1 − ) + () − (1 − )(1− )
1
 − (1 − )(1− )
 (52)
Under linear hedging costs, we can solve for  in terms of the underlying parameters:
 =
 (1 −  + )
[ − (1 − )(1− )][ +  (1 − )]
−

1 [1 −  +  +( 1− )(1− )]
[ − (1 − )(1− )]
(53)
=





− (1 − )(1− )[ +  (1 − ) − (1 −  + )]
1
[ − (1 − )(1− )][ +  (1 − )]
(54)
Characterization of Equilibrium under Partial Collateralization: This section
contains the breakeven conditions used to derive the equilibrium under partial collateraliza-
tion (Proposition 7). Under partial collateralization, the required derivative position is given
by
 ()=() − 

1  (55)
T h ec r e d i t o r ’ sa n dd e r i v a t i ve counterparty’s breakeven conditions are given by




















41which implies that, under linear hedging costs,
()=


















− (1 − )(1− )
 − (1 − )(1− )
(58)
Substituting (57) into (58) yields the expression for () given in the Proposition.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 :Assume that the ﬁrm receives the high cash ﬂow 
1 but has
to make a payment () on its derivative position. The ﬁrm will meet its total payment
obligation ()+() under two conditions. First, the cash available to the ﬁrm must be
suﬃcient, which is the case whenever


1 − [()+()] ≥ 0 (59)
Second, the ﬁrm must have no incentive to default strategically. This is the case whenever







T h el e f th a n ds i d ei st h ep a y o ﬀfrom making the contractual payment and continuing, whereas
the right hand side is the payoﬀ from declaring default, pocketing 
1 − 
1 and letting the
creditor and the derivative counterparty split 











Equation (38) follows from taking the derivatives of equations (35) and (36) and simplifying.
Proof of Corollary 4: The result follows from substituting (35) and (36) into (37) and
42simplifying. The constants not given in the main text are
Γ0 =
(1 − )(1− )[ − (1 − )(1− )] + 1 −  + 
 +  (1 − )+
 (62)
Γ1 =
[ − (1 − )(1− )][ +  (1 − )]
 +  (1 − )+
 (63)
Proof of Proposition 11: Let us ﬁrst consider junior derivatives. We know that when
the ﬁrm has an incentive to hedge, it will choose  =  =  − 
1 . We also know that
in this case  = 1−+
−(1−)(1−). Inserting this into (41), and taking derivatives with respect
to  ( t a k i n gt h ef a c ev a l u eo fd e b ta sg i v e n )w eﬁnd that the ﬁrm has an incentive to choose









Minimum basis risk can thus be sustained when, under the expectation that the ﬁrm
will choose minimum basis risk, the face value of debt  ( = max) is such that (64)
is satisﬁed. When (64) cannot be satisﬁed, the ﬁrm chooses maximum basis risk and
 =  ( = min) − 
1 .
Let us now consider senior derivatives. Diﬀerentiating (41) with respect to ,w eﬁnd












Minimum basis risk can thus be sustained when, under the expectation that the ﬁrm will
choose minimum basis risk, the face value of debt  ( = max) is such that (65) is satisﬁed,
given the ﬁrm’s optimal derivative position which for max   is given by  =  − 
1 .




 ,w eﬁnd that minimum basis risk and










43This condition is harder to satisfy than (64) since 1+
  1 and ( = max)   ( = max)
When (65) is not satisﬁed, only  = min can be sustained. If min  , this means that
the ﬁrm will then also choose a derivative position that fully dilutes creditors in the default
state.
7.2 Appendix B: A Model with Renegotiation
This note develops an alternative model that to analyze the bankruptcy status of derivatives
in the presence of renegotiation. While in the main text, the ﬁrm commits not to renegotiate
in the case of default, here we allow for renegotiation following default. For simplicity, we
assume that the ﬁrm has full bargaining power in renegotiation.
No derivatives: Consider the same setup as in the main text, but assume that renego-
tiation is possible. As before, in the absence of derivatives, the ﬁrm always defaults if the
low cash ﬂow 
1 realizes at date 1. We will refer to this outcome as a liquidity default.A s

1  ,t h el o wc a s hﬂow is not suﬃcient to repay the face value of debt. Moreover, the
date 2 cash ﬂow 2 is not pledgeable, and since the ﬁrm has no other cash it can oﬀer to
renegotiate with the creditor, the ﬁrm has no other option than to default when 
1 is real-
ized at date 1. The lender then seizes the cash ﬂow 
1 and shuts down the ﬁrm, collecting
the liquidation value of the asset . Early termination of the project leads to a social loss of
2 − , the additional cash ﬂow that would have been generated had the ﬁrm been allowed
to continue its operations.
If the high cash ﬂow 
1 realizes at date 1,t h eﬁrm has enough cash to service its debt.
However, the ﬁrm may still choose not to repay its debt. We refer to this choice as a strategic
default. A strategic default occurs when the ﬁrm is better oﬀ defaulting on its debt at date
1 than repaying the debt and continuing operations until date 2. In particular, the ﬁrm will
make the contractual repayment  only if the following incentive constraint is satisﬁed:






1 +  (67)
44where  denotes the surplus that the ﬁrm can extract in renegotiation after defaulting
strategically at date 1. The constraint (67) says that, when deciding whether to repay ,
the ﬁrm compares the payoﬀ from making the contractual payment and collecting the entire
date 2 cash ﬂow 2 to the payoﬀ from defaulting strategically, pocketing 
1 − 
1 and any
potential surplus  from renegotiating with the creditor. Repayment of the face value  in




1 + 2 −  (68)
In contrast to the analysis in the paper, we now assume that in renegotiation the ﬁrm can
make a take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer to the creditor. This means that after strategic default, the
ﬁrm can always oﬀer  to the creditor (i.e., the creditor receives a total payment of 
1 +),
making him just indiﬀerent between liquidating the ﬁrm and letting the ﬁrm continue. The
surplus from renegotiation to the ﬁrm would then be given by  = 2 − . Hence, the
maximum face value that is compatible with repayment is given by  = 
1 + .T h i s
immediately implies that the project can be ﬁnanced as long as
 ≤  ≡ 

1 +  (69)
This is intuitive. Since the ﬁrm can always pretend to have received the low cash ﬂow
and make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the creditor, there is no way the creditor can ever
extract more than 
1 +. When the low cash ﬂow realizes, the ﬁrm cannot renegotiate and
is liquidated.
As in the paper, the social surplus generated in the absence of derivatives is equal to the









1 −  (70)
45We summarize the credit market outcome in the absence of derivatives in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 12 In the absence of derivative markets, the ﬁrm can ﬁnance the project as
long as  ≤  ≡ 
1 + . When the project can attract ﬁnancing, the face value of debt
is given by  =
£
 − (1 − )(
1 + )
¤








Senior derivatives: Now consider senior derivatives. The optimal derivative position
is such that it eliminates default in the low state when derivative pays out. This requires
setting
 =  − 

1  (71)
The cost  of the derivative position  is determined by the counterparty’s breakeven
constraint
 =( 1− ) +  (72)
The ﬁrm still defaults with probability (1 − )(1− ). In that case, the ﬁrm is liquidated
and the derivative party receives  before the creditor is paid oﬀ. Hence, there is 
1 +−
left over to pay oﬀ the creditor. Hence, as long as  ≤ 
1 +− the creditor can be fully
paid oﬀ even when derivatives are senior, such that  =  Financing with risk-free debt is
possible as long as  ≤ 
1 +− When 
1 +−≤ 
1 +, the creditor cannot be
fully paid oﬀ in default. Debt is then risky and the face value determined by the breakeven
condition









 − (1 − )(1− )
¡

1 +  − 
¢
[ +( 1− )]
 (74)
46Junior derivatives: Again, the optimal derivative position eliminates default in the in






When debt is senior, debt is fully paid oﬀ as long as  ≤ 
1 + (debt is eﬀectively risk-free,
but sometimes has to be paid out of liquidation proceeds). Beyond 
1 +  no ﬁnancing is
possible. This means that whenever ﬁnancing is possible, debt is safe:

 =  (76)
The breakeven condition for the junior derivative counterparty is given by




1 +  − 
¢
=( 1− ) +  (77)
Proposition 13 Comparing junior and senior derivatives: We are now in a position
to compare junior and senior derivatives when renegotiation is possible and the ﬁrm has all
bargaining power in renegotiation. The above analysis implies that there are two cases:
1. As long as  ≤ 
1 +  − , debt is safe whether derivatives are junior or senior:
 =  = . Hence, the seniority of the derivative position does not matter.
2. When 
1 +−≤ 
1 +, debt is risk-free when derivatives are junior, but risky
when derivatives are senior. Hence, on this interval  and senior derivatives
a r em o r ee ﬃcient.
7.3 Appendix C: Hedging and Taxes
So far we have abstracted from corporate tax considerations that may aﬀect the optimal
choice of priority ordering of derivatives and debt. If the ﬁrm can beneﬁtf r o matax shield
47i nt h ef o r mo fi n t e r e s td e d u c t i o n sf r o mi t st a x a b l ee a r n i n g s ,a si st h ec a s ei np r a c t i c e ,a
natural question to ask is whether the presence of such a debt tax shield may aﬀect our
conclusion that it is optimal for debt to be senior to derivatives. To be able to address
this question we introduce a corporate tax rate 0 into our model. Speciﬁcally, we now
assume that the ﬁrm must pay corporate taxes on its earnings exceeding debt repayments.
Moreover, we allow the ﬁrm to make a leverage decision by raising more than the required
setup cost  at date 0. For simplicity we assume that any excess ﬁnancing raised through
the promised face value  is spent (consumed) by the ﬁrm at date 0.
No derivatives: Consider ﬁrst the ﬁrm’s optimal choice of leverage in the absence of
derivatives. As the ﬁrm’s low earnings 
1 at date 1 a r et o ol o wt ob ea b l et om e e ti t sd e b t
repayments ,i td o e sn o tp a ya n yc o r p o r a t et a x e sw h e n
1 is realized. But when the ﬁrm’s
high earnings 
1 are realized it now also faces a tax liability of (
1 −) In addition, the
date 2 earnings 2 are also taxable and result in a date 2 tax bill of 2.
As before, the ﬁrm can still choose to default strategically when its date 1 realized
earnings are 
1 , in which case the ﬁrm diverts the diﬀerence in earnings 
1 − 
1 and is
liquidated.18 As a result of corporate taxation, the ﬁrm has more to gain from strategic
default, as the after-tax value of continuation under truthful disclosure of its earnings is
lower: The ﬁrm’s incentive constraint is now given by
(1 − )(






As can be readily seen from this constraint, the higher is the corporate tax rate ,t h e
lower is the maximum repayment  that the ﬁrm can credibly promise to make at date 1
conditional on earning 
1 .19
18The ﬁrm can divert 
1 − 
1 by reporting that its realized earnings were only 
1 to its creditors and
the tax authorities. Given that the ﬁrm faces no tax liabilities when it reports 




19Note that our modeling of corporate taxation in the context of a model of corporate ﬁnancing with
limited commitment implicitly assumes that the tax authorities have a better collection technology available
for collecting tax liabilities than creditors. In fact, we assume that in the face of evidence of positive earnings
(such as the ﬁrm’s ability to meet its debt obligations) the tax authorities are able to fully collect the ﬁrm’s
48Given this corporate tax regime, what is the optimal capital structure for the ﬁrm? In
other words, what is the optimal level of the promised debt repayment ?E x c e p tf o rt h e
limited commitment problem, our model is a standard binomial example of a static tradeoﬀ
theory of leverage (see, e.g., Brennan and Schwartz (1978)). In a pure tradeoﬀ analysis of
expected bankruptcy costs versus tax shield beneﬁts in the context of our model there can
only be two candidate values for optimal debt repayments at date 1,  = 
1 or  = 
1 .T h e
lower level maximizes the debt tax shield subject to avoiding default and costly liquidation,
while the higher level provides a complete tax shield at the risk of liquidating the ﬁrm should
date 1 realized cash ﬂow be 
1 .
As can be immediately seen, in a model with limited commitment the classical tradeoﬀ
analysis no longer applies: the ﬁrm would not be able to raise suﬃcient ﬁnancing to cover
the setup cost  by promising only  = 
1 ,a n dap r o m i s eo f = 
1 may not be credible
as it may violate the ﬁrm’s incentive constraint (78). The only feasible levels of  with
limited commitment are such that
 ≥  ≡




so that the ﬁrm is able to raise suﬃcient ﬁnancing to cover the setup cost ,a n d
 ≤  ≡ 







so that the ﬁrm’s incentive constraint (78) holds.







(1 − )and therefore that  ≤ 
1 . Under this assumption, it is
tax liability. While this is clearly an extreme assumption, which we make for simplicity, it is in line with the
existing literature. See Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2007) for an analysis of corporate taxation and corporate
governance and for evidence consistent with the view that strategic default is worsened with higher corporate
taxes in environments with weak governance (i.e., worse commitment problems for ﬁrms). Nonetheless, we
could relax this assumption by allowing for imperfect tax collection and still obtain our main results on the
optimality of senior debt.
49easy to see that the optimal level of promised repayment ∗ is such that the ﬁrm’s incentive
constraint (78) binds, ∗ = . Suppose, by contradiction that , then the ﬁrm’s
expected payoﬀ is given by
(1 − )(

1 −  + 2)+[  +( 1− )

1 − ] (81)
The ﬁrst term represents the ﬁrm’s expected earnings after debt repayments and taxes, and
the second term represents the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial slack (the ﬁrm’s cash holdings net of the
capital expenditure ).20 Consider now an incremental promise of   0 above .T h i s
increases the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ by   0, so that any promise  cannot be
optimal. In sum, the ﬁr m ’ so p t i m a lc h o i c eo fl e v e r a g ei nt h ea b s e n c eo fd e r i v a t i v e si sg i v e n
by the highest incentive compatible promised repayment . This is the repayment that
maximizes the tax shield beneﬁts of debt.
Derivatives in the presence of taxes: We now let the ﬁrm also take a derivative position
 with basis risk, i.e., 1.T h a ti s ,a sb e f o r et h eﬁrm agrees to pay a premium  in the
event that the random variable  ∈ {} takes the value  against the payment 
by the insurance seller in the event that  = .21
Consider ﬁrst the situation where the derivative is senior, such that in default the coun-
terparty is paid oﬀ ﬁrst and receives , while creditors only receive 
1 −. As before, given
the hedging cost, the optimal derivative position just hedges the ﬁrm’s operational risk, i.e.,
 =  − 
1 . Given this derivative position, the ﬁrm’s incentive constraint (78), in the
presence of corporate taxes, becomes:22
(1 − )(






20Against a promised repayment of , creditors are willing to lend a maximum amount, at zero market
interest rates, of  +( 1− )
1 .
21As before the random variable  is positively correlated with the ﬁrm’s date 1 cash ﬂow, with Pr(
1 ∧
)=−(1−)(1−), Pr(
1 ∧)=( 1 −)(1−), Pr(
1 ∧)=( 1 −)(1−),a n dPr(
1 ∧)=( 1 −).
22Note that there is also an incentive constraint that governs strategic default in the state 
1 ∧ 
However, since  =  − 
1 ,t h eﬁrm’s taxable income in this state is given by 
1 +  −  = 
1 − 
1 ,
such that the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ and incentives to default strategically in this state are independent of 
50Note that the premium  is a cost that reduces taxable earnings in this state of nature.
Should the ﬁrm choose to strategically default by hiding its true realized gross earnings 
1
and reporting only 
1 it would still be able to divert the amount 
1 − 
1 , which explains
the form of the modiﬁed constraint (82).
As long as the cost of hedging  is not too high, the same reasoning as in the case without
derivatives leads to the conclusion that it cannot be optimal to set
() ≡ 







However, this now no longer implies that  = (),a st h eﬁrm could choose to strategically
default in equilibrium in state 
1 ∧  and only repay the promised amount  in the
states 
1 ∧  and 
1 ∧  when it gets the insurance payment  =  − 
1 .W e w i l l
show, however, that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to have debt be senior to derivatives whether
it chooses an optimal promised repayment  = () (such that the incentive constraint is
satisﬁed) or () (such that the incentive constraint is violated).
Consider ﬁrst the case where there is no strategic default in equilibrium and  = ().
In this case the premium paid by the ﬁrm on the senior derivative position is given by:
 =







and, from the incentive constraint (82) we know that
()+ = 







In contrast, when derivatives are junior the optimal promised repayment under no equi-











where from the counterparty’s breakeven condition we know that

 =





 − (1 − )(1− )
 (87)
Substituting for the equilibrium values of  and  and solving for the equilibrium ex-
pressions for () and () it is straightforward to show (see appendix for details) that
()  (). In other words, the face value of debt that maximizes the tax beneﬁti sl o w e r
under junior derivatives than under senior derivatives. This, in turn, implies that the re-
quired derivative position and the concomitant deadweight cost of hedging are smaller when
derivatives are junior, i.e.,   .
Consider next the situation where the ﬁrm strategically defaults in equilibrium in state

1 ∧ . In this case the ﬁrm only pays taxes in state 









as  =  − 
1 . Since in this case the ﬁrm’s tax liability is independent of the level of
promised repayment , it is optimal for the ﬁrm to minimize the face value  so as to
minimize the deadweight cost of insurance  = ( − 
1 ). As in the analysis without
corporate taxes, the required face value of debt  is minimized when derivatives are junior:
  .
We thus conclude that also in the presence of corporate taxation it is optimal for the
ﬁrm to have debt be senior to derivatives. The argument for why debt should be senior to
derivatives in the absence of corporate taxation essentially transposes to the case where the
23Recall that the superscript  refers to the case in which debt is senior and derivatives junior.
52ﬁrm is subject to corporate taxes: it is less costly for the ﬁrm to maximize the tax beneﬁts
of deb when derivatives are junior to debt. This was not obvious ap r i o r ias the higher face
value of debt when derivatives are senior would seem to imply a beneﬁti nt h ef o r mo fa
higher debt tax shield. However, as we have shown, this potential beneﬁt of a higher debt
tax shield is always outweighed by the higher deadweight cost of hedging.
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